

ORCHESTRATED TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASS THINKING

Chavdar Hristov

Abstract: This article deals with the thesis that any significant socio-economic transformation is accompanied by an institutionally guided process of change in mass thinking according to the new ideological imperatives whose carrier it is. Without any such values support it could not be carried out successfully. The mental transformation follows a communication model that emerged as a historically well-established social practice with a specific mechanism of combining restrictive and propaganda activities of varying strength and generational focus in analogous situations. Its main objectives are the new generations who must support and enforce the implemented social change over a sustained period of time. The hypothesis is presented that in the totalitarian to a democratic society transition in the Bulgarian example a similar model of mass thinking transformation is applied. A social survey research was conducted among part of the new generation to confirm or reject this hypothesis. Although the sample is not a representative one, it outlines trends that confirm the operation of the model by the presence of ideological beliefs that largely overlap with the new values. At the same time these trends highlight generational and other influences that characterize them as a generation of the transition period with hybrid ideas (borrowed from the past and present) about the modern democratic society structure.

Key words: mass thinking, change, mental transformation, ideological beliefs, transition period

Theoretical concept to change the mass thinking

Any significant socio-organizational and economic transformation incorporates in itself a system of beliefs (ideology), which sets out the strategic direction of the implemented social change. To be successful it needs public support, which is provided by changing the ideological beliefs in the mass thinking as a result of the application of a specific and tested for its effectiveness in human history mechanism. It combines restrictive and propaganda information activities that are activated simultaneously and achieve the desired result albeit over a prolonged period of time. This sustained period of time is mainly due to the

resistance of the group thinking dominated by prejudices and stereotypes linked to the previous system of beliefs. To overcome it a generational change and replacement of ideological stereotypes with others is required. This entire period of transformation is characterized by a confrontation – political and social, especially when it comes to the change of a totalitarian system with a democratic one.

Changing beliefs in mass thinking is aimed primarily at the creation of a “*new man*” whose worldview perceptions and values are in unison with the ideas of the socio-economic transformation performed. In this regard the formation of the new man as a way of thinking is defined by some authors as “*an anthropological revolution*” [Milza, 2007: 904]. And the process itself is understood as a change “*in the hearts and minds*” of the people. It is carried out through institutionally guided actions that have differentiated focus depending on the generational differences. On the one hand it is aimed at *limiting* the participation of the actively involved with the former regime in government after the transformation, and on the other – their *education* in compliance with the changed ideological dominants as the efforts are concentrated mainly on the *new generation*. The pattern of change is derived on the basis of a study of the practices of the totalitarian regimes [Hristov, 2011]. It is applied with varying degree of success and severity on its repressive part, for example, by the Allies in the de-nazification (indoctrination) in Germany and Austria after the World War II [Perry, 2007; Puaca, 2009; Taylor, 2011], and after the conflicts in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) [Taylor, 2003: 304-312] or in de-Ba’athification¹ after the war in Iraq (2003) [Howard, 2007].

Changing the system of ideological beliefs in mass thinking has its own mechanism that acts flawlessly though extended in time. Its main activities, which are driven simultaneously are change of legislation, in particular introduction of *lustration laws*, *rewriting the textbooks*, *replacement of the visual symbols* (national emblem, the denomination of the national currency, statues, busts, bas-reliefs and sculptures, monumental buildings, etc.), *renaming of cities, villages, streets and toponyms*, *change of everyday and media vocabulary*, *redefinition of the enemy* (universal, regional, according to the situation), *change of the entire communication environment* through the propaganda media tools [Hristov, 2014: 165-171; 271-273], [Hristov, 2015: 49-59].

Social survey research of the process of change of mass thinking beliefs

In order to verify the operation of this model in the transition process (socio-economic transformation) from a totalitarian to a democratic social order in Bulgaria and with the aim to establish a process of changing beliefs in mass thinking a social survey research was carried out within the period January - April 2015.² Grounds for the possible control of this process gives Resolution 1096

¹ From the Arab Socialist Party Baath

² Found scientific research of SU “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Contract №132/07.04.2015 г. on “Change of mass thinking”, led by Assoc. Prof. Chavdar Hristov, PhD. Data processing and graphics–ESI-CENTER, Sofia, e-mail: esi_center@abv.bg

(1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on *measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems* where there are recommendations for transformation of mentalities (transformation of “hearts and minds”) with specific guidelines that correspond with the hypothesis that the change shall be targeted at the restructuring of the old institutional systems.³

The sample is formed by *the direct-response method* and covers 504 university students born in the beginning of the transition period who represent the new generation as they are mostly aged between 18 and 30 years (90.1%) and a smaller part aged 30 and older (9.9%). Those studying different specialties in Bachelor’s degree are 86% and Master degree – 14%. Accordingly by gender women are 66.7% and men 33.3%. They are relatively evenly distributed by 50 students from 10 Bulgarian universities as follows: Sofia (Sofia University “Kliment Ohridski”, University of National and World Economy and University of Library Studies and Information Technologies), Plovdiv (Plovdiv University “Paisii Hilendarski”), Varna (VFU “Chernorizets Hrabar”), Blagoevgrad (South-West University “Neofit Rilski”), Ruse (“Angel Kanchev” University of Ruse), Svishtov (D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics), Stara Zagora (Trakia University), Pleven (Medical University) and this way representatives from most regions of the country are covered. The study given its specificity is aimed at educating and educated young Bulgarians. It is not a representative one and the conclusions made relate only to the respondents.

The questionnaire contains 20 open-ended and closed questions.

The majority of respondents (83.1%) understand the change in mass thinking as a change in the hearts and minds of people. At the same time a small part of them (10.3%) are familiar with the recommendations of Resolution 1096 (1996) of PACE. The latter is important regarding the lack of bias to the study issues.

• Attitude towards totalitarian heritage

Part of the respondents (21%) considers that *everything of the totalitarian heritage must be dismantled* and the rest of them (70.1%) *only that, which hinders the democratic process* (see Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Attitude towards the totalitarian heritage: Should everything be dismantled or only that, which hinders the development and consolidation of the democratic processes? (%)




Fig. 2. Attitudes towards what hinders the democratic development (%) Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.

Explaining further in *the free answers* what they understand under what hinders the democratic development the respondents show respect both to the *totalitarianism* and to *the contemporary situation*. (see **Fig.2**)

What **hinders** the democratic process from the totalitarian regime (28.5%) is the one-party system, the Communist Party, the cult of personality, autocracy, camps, State security, files, the pursuit of people who have different ideas, lack of freedom of expression, separation of people to “ours” and “yours”, party propaganda, etc.

What **hinders** the democratic process in the contemporary situation (18.8%) is the oligarchies, corruption, monopolies, the quality of education, non-functioning institutions, new moral values, the participation of “former” in the government, non-observance of the law, etc.

Focusing on that, which **does not** hinder the democratic processes and shall be preserved, they specify preservation of monuments of cultural and historical significance (19.1%), achievements of the totalitarian regime (17.3%) and democratic achievements (16.6%) as the last two are almost equal (see **Fig.3**).

The totalitarian regime achievements are expressed in the free health care, army, state system, state enterprises, work for all, insurance, compulsory voting, morals, compliance with common rules, discipline, faith, etc.

The democratic achievements are in the form of government, legislation, compliance with the laws, human rights protection, electoral system, freedom of choice, freedom of speech, pluralism, etc.

Summarizing the respondents' views it could be affirmed that they are **critical** both to the totalitarian regime negatives and modern democratic process negatives in the country but *prevailing is the critical attitude towards totalitarianism*




Fig. 3. Attitude towards what is not hindering the democratic development (%)*Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.*

(28.5% against 18.8%). At the same time it comes to the fore *a hybrid notion of past and present what the modern democratic society should be where the burden is placed on the state and social justice, but also on the personal freedom.*

• **Attitude towards the lustration laws**

Most of them express *partial support* of the imposition of the new ideological values through the mechanisms of *lustration and decommunisation laws* – respectively 50.8% and 52.8%. Against are 24.4% and 20.4% and those, who fully support them are 7.5% and 12.1% (see **Fig.4** and **Fig.5**). The high percentage of partial support indicates *relatively serious hesitation regarding the implementation of such restrictive measures albeit legal.* To a large extent this is confirmed by the ratio between those, who definitely do not support them and those, who support them (44.8% to 19.6%).




Fig. 4. Support of imposition of the new ideological beliefs through the lustration laws mechanism (%)




Fig. 5. Support of the imposition of the new ideological values through the decommunisation laws mechanism (%)

The respondent's attitude *towards opening the files* of those involved in the activities of the special services of the totalitarian regime (lustration measure) indicate more *positive attitude towards this legal act*. They believe this has been the *refusal* of the former political elite to participate in the political life (9,0%) and in government (11,3%), as well as the support of individuals with records for power and influence *is limited* (26,3%), *removed* is the artificial public aura of the employees of these structures (32,3%) and *greater* public awareness of "who is who" is achieved (61%), as well as public *sensitivity* to secret offices activity *is increased* (42,3). At the same time they believe that this law has put in an *unfair position* those, who have actually worked for the security of the country (31%) and destroyed their families (6%). Some of them are on the opinion (11, 5%) that the files should not have been opened but destroyed as it is done in other countries. If we summarize these attitudes (see **Fig.6**), the prevailing part of them is relat-




Fig. 6. The effect achieved by opening the files (%)*Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.*




Fig. 7. Effect achieved by the lustration measures (%)

ed to *the need for increased public awareness and sensitivity to the secret service activities*, which is inline with the democratic ideas of the role of the civil society.

Regarding *the effect achieved by the restrictive (lustration) measures* for appointment of persons associated with the totalitarian regime to senior positions in the executive authority, more than a half of the respondents are of the opinion that *the result desired is not achieved* (55.5%) and only 18.8 that there are effective (see Fig.7).

• **Attitude towards re-writing the Bulgarian history textbooks**

The respondents' attitude towards the need for a new reading of the Bulgarian history is controversial. Some of them are of the opinion that it is necessary, citing the need to achieve *European identity*(13.8%), denationalization to achieve the *European integration* (9.1%), *overcoming of ethnocentrism*and cultivating of plu-




Fig. 8. Attitude to the need of a new reading of the Bulgarian history (%). Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.




Fig. 9. Attitude towards re-writing of history textbooks (%).*Note:* The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.

realistic attitudes in understanding the historical facts (17.4%), as well as formation of a *new attitude towards “the other”* (15.6%). The other part are of the opposite opinion as the new reading will be *influenced by the political situation* (11.2%), it will *reinforce the division* in society (6.9%), the *national identity will be lost* (16.8%) and mostly the history should be based on the historical facts (48.7%). The overall result indicates **that the majority (57%) are not supporters of the new reading of the history** as the main arguments are related to the factual correctness and the fear of loss of the national identity. The rest (38.1%) show a **tendency to change** dictated by the common European and democratic values. According to the keywords the **European integration attitudes** are outlined on the account of the fears of loss of national identity and the ratio is 40.3% against 16.8%. (see **Fig. 8**).

The attitude towards **re-writing the Bulgarian history textbooks** remains relatively of the same controversial character as the one about the need for a new reading of history (see **Fig. 9**).

The positive attitude (40.7%) is grounded on the statements that re-writing *gives a new historical picture* (15.8%), shows *previously unknown historical facts* (30.8%), and *overcomes the national nihilism and nationalism* (8.7%). To it the explanations of answer “other” are added (see **Fig.10**), where it comes to the fore the statement that current textbooks *distort or hide the historical truth* (41.5%) or are *incomprehensible* (15.1%). Here could be seen the prevailing view that the **re-writing the history textbooks is necessary in order to give an accurate historical picture of what have happened**.

The negative attitude (59.4%) is based on the statements that the *re-writing is not based on scientific searches* (21.1%), *develops under the pressure of the state institutions* (33%) or *non-governmental or external pressure* (25.3%). To it are added the explanations in the reply “Other” (see **Fig. 11**), where fears are about the *misrepresentation of the Bulgarian history* (30.1%), *serving political interests* (19.4%) and that it will cause *mismatching in the knowledge of the different generations* (6.5%).




Fig. 10. Attitude towards re-writing of history textbooks – positive in answer “Other“ (%)




Fig. 11. Attitude towards re-writing of history textbooks – negative in answer “Other“ (%)

We can see almost similar to the above view, but from a different position that presents mainly *fear of manipulative, ad hoc, performed under pressure distortion of the historical truth.*

The comparison of the opposite attitudes to the re-writing of the Bulgarian history textbooks outlines a general *tendency to concerns about a narrative that incorrectly presents or is presenting the historical facts.* Regardless the opposite views and arguments the respondents express *striving to correct cover of history and distrust of institutions* in the possibility this to happen. The dilemma “true-false” to the Bulgarian history textbooks expresses *hesitation* regarding the formation of identification and imposition of actual ideological attitudes what is

one of their most important purpose. It could be assumed that these hesitations reflect to a great extent the contemporary public debate on this issue as a result of the antagonism between generational and ideological influences.

• **Attitude towards re-writing the Bulgarian literature textbooks**

The attitude to the attempts *to change the Bulgarian literature textbooks contents* by inclusion or exclusion the works of different authors outlines the presence of very different from the above expressed attitudes (see **Fig. 12**). The majority of the respondents are *categorical* that the works of Hristo Botev (81%), Ivan Vazov (80.6%), Dimitar Dimov (75.2%), Nikola Vaptsarov (77.6%) and Hristo Smirneniski (76.6%) to which attempts have been made for restriction shall be studied. Relatively low is the proportion of those that are against the study of the works of these authors – average of about 10%. The *explicitness shown against the attempts to change* indicates the formation of sustained positive attitudes towards the doyens of the Bulgarian literature, which in turns appears to support the national identification and certain ideological dominants. At the same time more than half of the respondents show *neutral attitude to the study of the worksof other authors* (see **Fig. 13**), whose works are critical of the totalitarian regime – Georgi Markov (50.4%), Petko Ogoyski (57.7%), Iosif Petrov




Fig. 12. Attitude towards the efforts of change of Bulgarian literature training through *exclusion* of works of different authors ... (%)




Fig. 13. Attitude towards the efforts of change of Bulgarian literature training through *inclusion* of works of different authors ... (%)

(55.6) and Stefan Stamov (50.8%), which is most probably due to fact that they do not know them. Exception is Radoy Ralin as 49% express positive opinion to include his works in the Bulgarian literature textbooks. He is followed by Georgi Markov (25.6%), Stefan Stamov (20.8%), Iosif Petrov (17.9%) and Petko Ogoyski (14.7%). The comparison between the attitudes shows **unwillingness to the change of literature textbooks contents** despite the periodic institutional efforts in this direction. It could be assumed that the current opinion of the respondents most likely is formed under the pressure of the public opinion dominated by the ideological myths of the Ottoman rule and the unjust capitalist system from the beginning and middle of the last century.

• **Attitude towards the historical symbols change**

The majority of the respondents are **against changing the names of towns and villages, streets, monuments and toponyms** (see Fig. 14) associated with Bulgarian communist leaders (71.4%), anti-fascist struggle (65.7%), Soviet communist leaders (60.5%), and that this change shall not be done under the influence of the domestic political situation (62.3%) or ideological pilgrimage and fidelity (50.0%), but as a result of sincere gratitude to what was done (63.1%). At the same time they are for the change of *Turkish-Arab names* (54.8%), and for the *preservation of monuments* related to historical events regardless of our attitude towards them (79.8%). Here it can be seen a **civilization attitude towards the problem of preservation of the historical symbolism** in the names and monuments as part of the national memory. At the same time the opposite percentage portion shall not be ignored, which in some of the ideologically linked opinions is close to or is the same as the said indicating the possibility of future change in either direction, which is illustrated by the data summarized below. In this context it shall be noted that *the pentagram remains a permanent symbol of communism* (83.2%) despite its widespread use as a brand for commercial, religious and institutional goals.

• **Attitude towards the “different other”**

The attitude towards the **religious beliefs and those who confess them** in the majority is *neutral* encompassing Judaism (57.1%), Protestant (54.4%), Catholicism (53.0%), Buddhism (52.8%), Islam (46.8%) and Orthodoxy (33.3%). *The*




Fig. 14. Attitude towards the necessity to change the names of towns and villages, streets, monuments and places (%)

highest support is for Orthodoxy due to our religious affiliation (60.5%), and the lowest—Islam (30.0%), including the highest negative attitude to it (21.0%). The explicating attitudes indicate *the presence of religious tolerance* (see Fig. 15), *free-thinking, identification with Orthodoxy and residual negativity to Islam* and those who confess it. The latter indicates that *Islam still stands for the universal enemy* in mass thinking as a sustained ideological stereotype [Hristov, 2014].

This ideological stereotype *is supported* (see Fig. 16) by the highest negative attitude towards the Ottomans (65.3%), as apropos towards all the conquerors in general— fascist (64.1%), those of cultural and historical valuables (63.3%) and economic ones (53.6%).




Fig. 15. Attitude towards people of different religion (%)




Fig. 16. Attitude towards the conqueror (%)




Fig. 17. Attitude towards the other generations (%)




Fig. 18. Attitude towards the “other” (%)

The respondents’ attitude *towards people of different ages* (see Fig. 17.) indicates a strong support to those who are of working age (74.8%), retirement age (69.2%), to their own generation (69.8%) and especially to children (80.2%). Given the very low negative attitude towards each of the age groups outlined is *dominating lack of generational conflicts and contradictions*.

The attitude to the *different races* is predominantly positive (52.8%), as well as to *gender differences* (64.3%). At the same time to *those of different sexual orientation* prevails *the neutral attitude* (40.9%), but it has also the lowest support (18.5%). The summarization of this data (see Fig. 18) indicates *lack of racial and gender prejudices but also the presence of such to those of different sexual orientation*.

• **Attitude to the need for change in mass thinking**

The respondents’ attitude to the *repressive measures to impose change* in mass thinking is negative (see Fig. 19). The prevailing majority is of the opinion that such a change should not be done by force (78.8%), by concentration camps (80.6%), fear (81.3%), by religious dogmas (60.1%) and by using ideological prejudices and stereotypes (58.7%), which highlights their negative attitude towards the totalitarian practices. However their opinion regarding the imposition of the change by *the rule of the new laws is too hesitant*. Some of them have negative




Fig. 19. Attitude towards the repressive measures to impose change in mass thinking (%)

attitude (29.6%), the other – positive (34.3%), and the rest – neutral (32.5%), which are the highest compared to the other sub-questions. Prevailing support was declared to make the change through the works of art, literature and music (62.7%). Summarizing the opinions it can be concluded that majority of the respondents *strongly oppose the imposition of change in mass thinking through repressive measures and show support for the implementation of the mental transformation through the tools of the cultural propaganda*. Here it can clearly be seen also their tolerant attitude towards those of different thinking. At the same time their hesitant attitude towards compliance with the law could be interpreted as a reflection of the prolonged domestic political situation saturated with numerous critics against the Bulgarian justice.

The majority of the respondents *support the change in mass thinking* (see Fig. 20), but with series of conditions focusing on the change of moral values and old prejudices and stereotypes (23.6%), but without violence and foreign influence (22.4%) but through education, awareness, culture, compliance with law and quality of life (16.1%), through individual change (10.9%), through the media but without their manipulative effect (9.7%) and noting that this process is slow, gradual and it is difficult to achieve final result (16.7%). With negative attitude are (17.6%) and of no opinion (5.8%). Summarizing these opinions comes it to the fore the understanding that such *a change is necessary but shall be done by propaganda tools* of factors beyond the individual such as the national and European institutions.




Fig. 20. Attitude towards achieving of change in mass thinking (%).
Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.

• Attitude towards own worldview formation

Regarding the formation of *their own worldview* (see Fig. 21) the respondents ranked first *the influence of the family* (82.4%), followed by *the friends* (45.6%), *university* (39.8%), *school* (27.6%) and *media* (19.3%). In answer “other” they explain their attitude towards life as a result of the construction of their own personality (37.4%) and the accumulated life experience (14.1%), as well as under the influence of the society and institutions (19.2%), of literature, music and art (17.2%), religion and other beliefs (6.1%), sport and entertainment (6.1%). The significant effect of the family environment on the formation of the worldview of the young people indicates *generational influence, which explains to some extent their divergent attitudes towards the totalitarian past and hybrid ideas about how the modern democratic society should look*. In this regard it shall not be neglected the influence of the educational institutions and the circle of friends, which affect the one or the other. At the same time the respondents in their explanations about their attitude towards the world give greater importance to the individual attitudes (51.5%) compared to the public (48.5%) pressure.




Fig. 21. Attitude towards the own worldview formation (%).
Note: The total exceeds 100 as the question allows more than one answer.

Summary and conclusions

Summarizing the most important results from the social survey research on change of the ideological beliefs of the new generation it could be concluded that *the described theoretical model is working and could be used in other similar surveys*. In this case it recognizes an ongoing process of transformation in the mass thinking, which to a great extent reflects the situation of transition from totalitarian to a democratic society dominated by confrontation of old and new ideas. It is hardly possible to deduce a definite trend to a change because of the significant influence of the older generation on young people, but there are enough indicators of its presence.

A predominant negative attitude towards totalitarianism is noticed, but also sufficiently critical attitude towards the current situation. Given are the good and bad sides of the both socio-economic systems resulting in the formation of a hybrid idea of past and present, of what the modern democratic society shall be as the burden is placed on the state and social justice but also on the personal freedom, too.

The partial support that is expressed about the imposition of the new ideological values through the lustration and decommunisation laws indicates serious hesitation regarding the use of such mechanisms, although legal. The approval shown for opening the files is dictated primarily by a desire to increased public awareness and sensitivity to the work of the secret services.

The expressed strong support for the need for change in mass thinking explicitly excludes the use of repressive, violent measures as the burden is placed on education, information, culture, compliance with law and life standard thus showing tolerance towards those of different thinking and negativism towards the totalitarian practices.

The shaping of the young people's worldview is mostly under the influence of the family environment, educational institutions, circle of friends and at least of the media as in the first place is placed the importance of the personal attitude towards the change on the account of influence of the external environment.

The hesitation expressed to compliance with the laws in force and the need for a new reading of the history, which most likely is a result of the long-standing criticism of the Bulgarian judicial system and the public debate on the divergent interpretations of the historical facts, indicates the strength of the foreign influence. Prevailing are the views for the correct reflection of the Bulgarian history and fears of manipulative, ad hoc and performed under pressure distortion of the historical truth in the Bulgarian history textbooks, as well as distrust of the institutional capacity to achieve a positive result in this direction. On the other hand, there is a strong support to study the traditional Bulgarian authors in Bulgarian literature textbooks and ignorance of those, who have a critical look at the totalitarian regime, where also could seek the influence of the public debate on this issue and of the lasting prejudices and stereotypes related to the national identification. Perhaps here should be sought the answer to the question why young people are more inclined to revise their attitude towards the totalitarian heritage than to the Ottoman period. The presence of these and other similar divergent attitudes highlight a trend of parallel and relatively conflict-free pro-European and pro-national identification processes.

The expressed explicit unwillingness to change the names of towns and villages, streets, toponyms and removal of monuments regardless their ideological commitment to certain historical periods indicates civilization attitude towards the symbols of the national memory. Exception are the negative attitudes towards Turkish-Arab names, Ottomans, Islam and those who confess it, which in turn outlines the presence of a residual stereotype of the universal enemy most likely supported by the contemporary propaganda against the Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

The demonstrated strong support to people of different ages, different races, gender and religion show predominantly tolerable attitude to "the other". Although weak, but distinctly shown is the negative attitude towards the different

sexual orientation, which together with the negativism towards the Islam outline their presence as a sustained ideological prejudice in the new generation.

In conclusion it could be affirmed that the studied part of the new Bulgarian generation manifests active attitude towards the change of the ideological beliefs in mass thinking, approving, disapproving and looking for closer to their beliefs values, which in turn largely overlap with the generally accepted for democratic ones. At the same time they show hesitation in the choice between old and new ideas, new and old ideological myths under the influence of the family and friends environment, of the educational institutions, of the media and of the public debate, which presents them as a transient generation in the overall process of mass thinking change.

REFERENCES

- Milza, Pierre. 2007.** *История на Италия.* [Istoria na Italia]. София: Руба [Riva]
- Hristov, Chavdar.** *Модел на конструиране на стратегическа идея и трансформирането ѝ в идеология* (система от вярвания) [Model na konstruirane na strategicheska ideya i transformiraneto y v ideologia (sistema ot vyarvaniya)]. In: *Newmedia21.eu. Медиите на 21 век: Онлайн издание за изследвания, анализи, критика* [online], 28 декември 2011. Available from: <http://www.newmedia21.eu/izsledvaniq/model-na-konstruirane-na-strategicheska-ideya-i-transformiraneto-y-v-ideologiya-sistema-ot-vyarvaniya/> [Accessed: 30.08.2015]
- Hristov, Chavdar. 2014.** *Войната на идеите.* [Voinata na ideite]. София: УИ „Св. Кирил и Методи“ [“Sv. Kiril i Metodi”]
- Hristov, Chavdar. 2015.** *Промяна на масовото мислене.* [Promiana na masovoto mislene]. В: *Проблеми на обществената комуникация* [In: Problemi na obshtestvenata komunikatzia], 49-59. София: „За буквите – О писменехъ“ [“За bukвите – O pismenah”]
- Hristov, Chavdar.** *Универсалният враг.* [Universalniyat vrag] In: *Newmedia21.eu. Медиите на 21 век: Онлайн издание за изследвания, анализи, критика* [online], 19 март 2014. Available from: <http://www.newmedia21.eu/analizi/universalniyat-vrag/> [Accessed: 27.08.2015]
- Biddiscombe, Perry. 2007.** *The Denazification of Germany 1945-1950.* UK: Tempus
- Puaca, Brian. 2009.** *Learning Democracy. Education Reform in West Germany 1945-1965.* NY, Oxford: Bergbabu Books
- Taylor, Frederick. 2011.** *Exorcising Hitler. The Occupation and Denazification of Germany.* NY: Bloomsbury Press
- Howard, Lawrence E. 2007.** *Lessons Learned from Denazification and de-Ba'athification.* PDF URL: ADA469098
- Taylor, Philip M. 2003.** *Munitions of the mind. A history of propaganda from ancient world to the present era.* Manchester and New York: Manchester university press.

Correspondence address:

Chavdar Hristov, Assoc. Prof., PhD
Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”
Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication,
and Public Relations Department
1000 Sofia, 49, Moskovska St.,
Tel.: [+359] 888 519 876,
e-mail: ch_h@abv.bg